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A bio-economic model has been calibrated to the socio-economic and biophysical charac-
teristics of a less-favoured area in the Ethiopian highlands. Land degradation, population
growth, stagnant technology, and drought necessitates development of non-farm employment
opportunities in the area. The model has been used to assess the impact of improved access to
non-farm income on household welfare, agricultural production, conservation investments
and land degradation in form of soil erosion.
The model simulations indicate that access to low-wage oﬀ-farm income is restricted by
lack of employment opportunities since households otherwise would have engaged in more
oﬀ-farm wage employment than observed. The simulations show that better (unconstrained)
access to low-wage non-farm income has a substantial positive eﬀect on household income.
Total agricultural production (crop and livestock production) and farm inputs used are
reduced when access to non-farm employment is improved and thus increases the need to
import food to the area. Access to non-farm income reduces farm households incentives to
invest in conservation and this leads to more overall soil erosion and more rapid land0306-9192/$ - see front matter  2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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needed to ensure land conservation and to sustain local food production.
 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Nonfarm income; Market imperfections; Bioeconomic model; EthiopiaIntroduction
Little technological progress in agriculture, high population pressure and land
degradation cause a need to develop the rural non-farm sector in the East African
highlands (Block and Webb, 2001; Pender, 2000; Heyer and Campbell, 1999;
ADE, 1996) to reduce poverty and improve food security. Land reform and land
redistributions have until recently been used to avoid or minimize landlessness and
reduce poverty in Ethiopia. Land scarcity and increasing fragmentation of already
very small farms implies that the non-farm sector has to be developed to absorb
more of the growing population. The policy to promote adoption of credit to
stimulate adoption of high yielding varieties and fertilizer use has not been very
successful in the fragile and drought prone Ethiopian highlands. The policy
makers are therefore looking for alternative development strategies for these areas.
Development of non-farm income opportunities may be an alternative development
strategy.
The classical development economic models of Lewis (1954), Ranis and Fei (1961)
presumed that agricultural labour could be shifted to the industrial sector without
any reduction in total agricultural output. They called these economies ‘‘surplus la-
bour economies’’, implying that the shadow wage in agriculture is nil and that labour
is immobile. Sen (1966) developed a model that made it possible under certain con-
ditions to have a positive marginal product of labour and still no loss in output when
labourers are removed. We have developed a model that assesses the realism of these
classical models in terms of the eﬀect on the agricultural sector of providing non-
agricultural employment opportunities.
There have been controversies over how well labour markets in developing coun-
tries function and whether it is a good approximation to represent them as perfectly
competitive markets in economic models. Theoretical models with perfect labour
markets and missing labour markets can give very diﬀerent policy conclusions with
respect to the impact of various policy instruments, technological change and exo-
genous shocks on land management decisions of farm households (Kaimowitz and
Angelsen, 1998; Holden and Binswanger, 1998). The actual impact has therefore
to be studied through empirical case studies and use of applied models. The empir-
ical reality of labour markets is in most cases also somewhere between a perfect and a
missing labour market.
Empirical studies in rural Africa (Reardon, 1997; Bryceson and Jamal, 1997; Lit-
tle et al., 2001; Barrett et al., 2001) have revealed that non-farm sources may account
as much as 40–45% of average household income and seem to be growing in impor-
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wealth and may oﬀer a pathway out of poverty. The unequal distribution of non-
farm income indicates, however, that there are substantial entry barriers and steep
investment requirements to participation in non-farm activities capable of lifting
them out of poverty (Barrett et al., 2001). Such entry barriers are particularly high
for self-employment activities. The signiﬁcance of the entry barriers in wage-employ-
ment is less clear and some studies indicate that ‘‘push factors’’ have a strong impact
on the degree of involvement in wage-employment.
Improved access to non-farm sources of income is likely to be good for household
welfare, including food security. However, we know little about the impact of labour
market development or improved labour market access on the environment (man-
agement of natural resources). First, if agricultural production is liquidity con-
strained (for purchase of farm inputs), better access to non-farm income could
relieve the liquidity constraint and result in more intensive agriculture (Reardon
et al., 1994). Second, improved access to labour markets could reduce the labour
use in agriculture and this could mean less pressure on the natural resource base
and could be good (less of damaging use) or bad (less of conservation investment)
for the environment. Theoretical models cannot provide the answer to what the over-
all eﬀect of improved market access on the natural resource base is. Empirical studies
and empirical models are necessary to answer this question for speciﬁc local environ-
ments. Such studies and models require a comprehensive treatment of biophysical as
well as socio-economic conditions.
There is comprehensive evidence that improved market access, due to road build-
ing, can lead to more deforestation in land abundant areas (Kaimowitz and Angelsen,
1998). Evidence is less clear on the impact of improved market access in resource-poor
land-scarce areas. As relevant panel data barely exist on this issue, one may use bio-
economic models for such an analysis. The advantage of bio-economic models is that
we can do with and without analysis with realistic speciﬁcations of market structures,
the biophysical environment, and household preferences. They therefore represent a
good tool for assessment of dynamic economy-environment linkages and policy ef-
fects (Barbier and Hazell, 2000; Okumu et al., 2002).
In this study, we have used dynamic bio-economic models of representative
households to assess the impact of improved access to labour and credit markets
on household welfare and the natural resource base in a less-favoured land-scarce
economy in the Ethiopian highlands. We therefore, assess whether there may be
win–win beneﬁts from promotion of non-farm employment opportunities in the
Ethiopian highlands and whether development of the non-farm sector has no nega-
tive eﬀects on the agricultural sector like assumed in some of the classical models. We
therefore assess how better access to non-farm income aﬀects; (a) household welfare,
(b) agricultural production (output and input use), (c) investment in land conserva-
tion, and (d) land degradation (soil erosion).
We ﬁnd that better access to oﬀ-farm income reduces farm households incentives
to invest in conservation and that this leads to more overall soil erosion and more
rapid land degradation. The ﬁrst ﬁnding is consistent with some empirical studies
in northern Ethiopia (Shiferaw and Holden, 1998; Hagos and Holden, 2003). The
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Better (unlimited) access to oﬀ-farm income at the low seasonal wage rates that are
typical in the study area had a considerable positive impact on household welfare but
increased the need to import basic food grains to the area. Self-suﬃciency in food
seems not to be a viable option in the study area.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of
some relevant studies. Section 3 provides basic data on the case study area. Section
4 presents the bio-economic model used for the simulations. Section 5 presents sim-
ulation results and discusses them. Section 6 concludes.Review of relevant studies
Empirical studies in rural Africa show that there is a strong positive relation
between non-farm income share and total household income (Reardon, 1997).
Non-farm income was very unequally distributed, however, asset poverty appeared
to inhibit entry into remunerative non-farm earnings, implying a vicious self re-
enforcing circle of unequal distribution of farm and non-farm earnings in areas with
unequal distribution of land resources (Reardon et al., 2000). Many studies have re-
vealed evidence of wealth- diﬀerentiated barriers to entry in non-farm activities in
Burkina Faso, Coˆte dIvoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Africa, and Tanzania
(Reardon et al., 1992; Dercon and Krishnan, 1996; Dercon, 1998; Carter and May,
1999; Barrett et al., 2000). It remains uncertain whether and how policies can be
introduced to make non-farm income opportunities available for broad removal
of rural poverty. Likewise, the feedback eﬀects (growth linkages) to the agricultural
sector are uncertain.
Reardon et al. (1994) provide evidence from Burkina Faso that non-farm activi-
ties can be an important source of cash that potentially can be used to improve farm
productivity if it is used to ﬁnance farm input purchase or long-term capital invest-
ments. They conclude that sometimes non-farm activity draws resources away from
farm activity and does not lead to reinvestment of proﬁts on the farm, while in other
cases non-farm proﬁts are reinvested on the farm. Non-farm income activities are
more likely to have a positive impact on farm productivity in cases where the rural
credit market does not function. However, households have many other reasons for
allocating time to non-farm activities than to generate capital for farming. Whether
there are positive growth linkages from non-farm activity to farm activities is there-
fore uncertain. Labour market imperfections may cause the linkages to be negative
while credit market imperfections may lead them to be positive.
Block and Webb (2001) found that wealthier Ethiopian households tended to
have more diversiﬁed incomes and that those with initially more diversiﬁed in-
comes also had a greater increase in both income and calorie intake. This indi-
cates that inequality may increase over time due to diﬀerential access to non-
farm income.
Woldehanna and Oskam (2001) and Smith et al. (2001) found signs of labour
market duality in their studies in Ethiopia and Uganda, where the skilled and edu-
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uneducated depend on low-pay casual employment opportunities. They found that
oﬀ-farm low-wage employment was motivated by ‘‘push factors’’ such as low farm
income and availability of surplus labour, while people enter into non-farm self-
employment to earn an attractive return. Substantial entry barriers cause relatively
wealthy farm households to dominate the lucrative self-employment activities.
Non-farm unskilled wage employment was also limited, however, as they also found
that farm households could have allocated substantially more labour in oﬀ-farm
activities if there were enough jobs. They only worked (farm and oﬀ-farm) 47% of
their available labour time. A low reservation wage increases the willingness to
search for oﬀ-farm wage employment but does not guarantee that households suc-
ceed in ﬁnding employment. The signiﬁcance of ‘‘push factors’’ is therefore not
inconsistent with limited access to unskilled wage-employment. Other studies in
Kenya (Carter and Wiebe, 1990) and Rwanda (Byiringiro and Reardon, 1996) also
provide evidence of labour market failures and accumulation of household labour on
the farm, with marginal returns below that in the local labour market. This empirical
review illustrates that there is a need for a theory that can explain why wages do not
adjust down so that the labour market clears. We will come back to this when we
introduce the model.
Barrett et al. (2001) conclude that the poor have no other option but to diversify
out of farming and into unskilled oﬀ-farm labour, whether in agriculture or not. This
option is what we analyse the implications of for household welfare, production and
natural resource management in this study.
Holden et al. (2001) found signiﬁcant imperfections in land and labour markets
in the case study area for which we have developed the bio-economic model. The
econometric analysis of cross-section data revealed that households without oﬀ-
farm employment were less likely to fallow land while higher oﬀ-farm income in-
creased the probability of cropping. This may indicate that both labour and cash
constraints are at work. Benin (2003) found that households further from a dis-
trict town have higher crop productivity, especially in low rainfall areas in the
Amhara region. This indicates that having more nonfarm income opportunities
can reduce productivity in agriculture. Pender (unpublished) has found that
households with less land have more nonfarm income and households in low
potential areas have higher nonfarm income than households in high potential
areas in the Amhara region.
Shiferaw and Holden (1998), analysing data from the case study area, found that
oﬀ-farm income reduced incentives to keep (not remove) conservation structures that
have been introduced through external projects.
Pender et al. (2002) found in an analysis of data from Tigray, Ethiopia, that
households whose secondary income source was cereals (and had more non-farm in-
come than most other households) invested more in stone terraces than other house-
holds. Ehui and Pender (2003) found that food-for-work (FFW) and cash-for-work
(CFW) projects accounted for 40% of non-farm income in Tigray. Most FFW and
CFW projects have targeted investment in soil and water conservation in Tigray
(Hagos and Holden, 2003). Hagos and Holden (2003) found a positive impact of
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work (other than FFW) had a negative impact on probability of investing on soil
bunds.The case study area: Andit Tid
Andit Tid is located approximately 60 km east of Debre Berhan, along the
main road between Addis Ababa and the Tigray Region, in East Shewa in the
Central Ethiopian Highlands. This implies that the market access is fairly good.
The area is classiﬁed as belonging to the low potential cereal-livestock zone and
is severely degraded. It is a high altitude area (>3000 m.a.s.l.). The land is lo-
cated in two altitude zones; dega zone (<3200 m.a.s.l.) and wurch zone (>3200
m.a.s.l.). The average rainfall is 1336 mm per year distributed over two growing
seasons, the meher season from June to November and the belg season from Jan-
uary to May. Droughts have not been common in the area till very lately when
the belg rains have failed in two consecutive years (1999 and 2000), may be due
to global climate change. Hailstorms and frost have, however, commonly dam-
aged crops.
The two dominant soil types are andosols and regosols. Andosols dominate in the
wurch zone while regosols dominate in the dega zone. Yohannes (1989) estimated
75% of the land to be on steep slopes (>25% slope). Soil erosion rates in the area
are very high and a large share of the land is shallow, causing reduction of soil depth
to aﬀect crop rooting depth and thus yields (Shiferaw and Holden, 2001). Holden
and Shiferaw (2000) estimated 21% of the land to be shallow (<30 cm soil depth)
and 48% to be of medium depth (30–60 cm).
Various forms of conservation technologies are common in the area. They have
partly been introduced through external food-for-work programs. Some of the exog-
enously introduced conservation structures have later been removed by the farmers.
Shiferaw and Holden (1998) found that human population pressure (land scarcity)
increased the probability that conservation structures were partly or fully removed.
The reasons for this were thought to be that the conservation structures did not con-
tribute to increased yields in the short run, the structures occupied some land and
therefore reduced the eﬀective planting area, and the structures collected fertile soils
that could be used to increase short run production by dismantling the structures
and spreading out the soil collected there. The structures could also harbour rats that
may damage the crops. Or the removal was done in protest against the government
and because the local people were not involved in the choice and design of conser-
vation technologies.
The main crop in the area is barley, followed by wheat, horse bean, and ﬁeld
pea. Lentils and linseeds are also commonly grown. Most of the crop production
takes place in the dega zone but barley is also grown in the wurch zone in the belg
season.
Cattle and sheep are the dominant types of livestock but goats, equines and
chicken are also common. The animal population density is very high in the area,
Table 1
Average income by source and household group in Andit Tid in 1999
Income source 0 oxen households 1 oxen households 2 or more oxen households
Wage income 111 63 76
Remittance income 44 12 48
Common property res. income 35 27 37
Business income 73 85 38
Food aid 495 517 565
Farm incomea 394 330 55
Total income 1153 1028 1310
a This is cash income only. It does not include the value of crops or livestock products that were
produced and consumed by the household during the year. The year (1999) was a drought year, causing
total failure of crop production during the belg season.
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the Ethiopian highlands. We found this density to have increased to 2.03 TLU per ha
in 1998 but it declined to 1.71 by the end of 1999 due to the drought (Holden and
Shiferaw, 2000).
The human population density was estimated to be 145.5 persons per km2 in 1986
against the average of 61 persons per km2 for the Ethiopian highlands (Yohannes,
1989). The population density was 230 persons per km2 cultivable land. The popu-
lation growth rate was estimated to be 3.0% per year, indicating a high and increas-
ing population pressure in the area.
The land resources (land of diﬀerent qualities) are fairly evenly distributed in the
area due to the land reform and frequent land redistributions in Ethiopia where land
was allocated to households based on household size. Livestock wealth is therefore a
better indicator of household wealth and wealth diﬀerentiation. Particularly oxen
ownership signiﬁes the farming capacity of households. It leads to the typical pat-
tern, where households without oxen rent out land to households with two oxen
or more, while households with one ox exchange oxen among themselves. Land rent-
ing typically takes place in form of share tenancy, where the share to the owner var-
ies between 0.5 and 0.25 depending on land quality. Households may have access to
credit in kind for purchase of fertilizers but are reluctant to take this kind of credit
even though it appears proﬁtable to do so. Risk and high aversion to this type of risk
cause households to be reluctant to buy fertilizer on credit.
Households have limited access to oﬀ-farm income sources, and crop production
is highly subsistence oriented. The trend during the last 20 years has been from
households being net sellers of food grains to now being net buyers. The recent
droughts have even transformed the area to dependency on food aid (Holden and
Shiferaw, 2000). Observed seasonal wage rates (Birr per manday) in 1999 were as
follows; January (5), February–May (3), June–July (8), August–November (4),1 TLU is tropical livestock units.
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band, and households were assumed to have (constrained or unconstrained) access.
In Table 1 we present average income from diﬀerent sources for the three catego-
ries of households for 1999. We have divided non-farm income in wage income,
remittance income, common property resource, business income and food aid. Food
aid was received for the ﬁrst time in this community because 1999 was a drought year
as the belg season rains failed totally, causing farm income to be very low in this
year. FFW projects have not been used since the introduction of conservation tech-
nologies in the 1980s. Most of their food grain (barley) is usually produced in the
belg season. The low levels of non-farm income from diﬀerent sources indicate that
access to these sources of income was constrained and this also made them very vul-
nerable to drought and this necessitated provision of food aid.The bioeconomic model
Earlier versions of this model include Shiferaw et al. (2000, 2001), Holden and
Shiferaw (2004) and Holden et al. (2002). The main expansion of the model pre-
sented here is that we have used the model to analyse the impact of better access
to oﬀ-farm income on household welfare, production, investment and soil erosion.
Basic model structure
Households are maximizing their welfare (measured as discounted utility of cer-
tainty equivalent full income)
U ¼
Z T
0
qtutdt ¼
XT
0
qtut; ð1Þ
through a time-separable utility function over the time horizon T. Utility in period t
is discounted by the discount factor, qt ¼ 1
1þd
 t
, where d is the utility discount rate.
Utility in period t is represented by a constant partial relative risk aversion utility
function 2
ut ¼ ð1 lÞY 1l þ l 1; ð2Þ
where l is the partial relative risk aversion or the absolute value of the elasticity of
marginal utility of certainty equivalent full income, Y, which is equal to;
Y t ¼ EðI tÞ  w1t  w2t; ð3Þ
where E(It) is expected normalized full income in period t, w1t is a downside risk pre-
mium related to obtaining formal credit and w2t is a risk premium related to drought2 This type of utility function has been used by Binswanger (1981) and others in empirical studies of
risk preferences of farm households. Its simple form makes it attractive also for modelling purposes as risk
aversion is captured by a single parameter.
S. Holden et al. / Food Policy 29 (2004) 369–392 377risk in the belg season. Full income was normalized by the poverty line full income
(ct). This formulation gives utility equal to zero if the household has Yt = 1, negative
utility if Yt is below the poverty line (Yt < 1), and positive utility if Yt > 1. Population
growth aﬀects the time endowment and poverty line income causing both to grow
proportionally over time.Market characteristics
The model incorporates the following market characteristics. We leave out the
subscript for year to simplify notation.
Credit market: Formal credit in kind (for fertilizer) that is constrained from above
(Eq. (10))
pfFe ¼ Cf 6 Cf : ð4Þ
This credit must be repaid after harvest. It may also be possible to obtain informal
credit within the village at a higher rate of interest (Eq. (11))
Ci6 Ci: ð5Þ
This credit must also be paid back within the same year.
Labour market: Households are assumed to have constrained access to non-farm
employment and the wage rate in the labour market varies across seasons. House-
holds may also hire labour for work on the farm. Hired labour is not a perfect sub-
stitute to family labour, however, as there are search, screening and monitoring costs
related to hiring labour (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995; Feder, 1985). Likewise, there
are search costs related to ﬁnding oﬀ-farm employment. A transaction cost related to
hiring labour of about 10–20% of the wage rate is added to capture this. The house-
hold shadow wage, wp, should fall between the buying wage and the selling wage
when households do not participate and are not rationed out of the labour market.
wsp6wp6wbp: ð6Þ
Empirical evidence seems to indicate that there are limited oﬀ-farm employment
opportunities and households may be rationed out of the labour market. This may
cause the shadow wage in agriculture to fall below the market wage rate. This is a
classical issue in development economics and goes back to the Lewis model (Lewis,
1954) and the eﬃciency wage theory (Leibenstein, 1957, 1958). There are nutrition
based and learning based explanations for the failure of the market wage to fall suf-
ﬁciently to clear the market. We think that the nutrition-based explanation is plau-
sible in Ethiopia. Clark and Haswell (1970) (cited in Ray, 1998, p.273) provide
estimates of energy requirements for agricultural work (from West Africa) in the
range of 213–502 KCal per hour of work, showing a clear rationale for a minimum
wage. This creates an equilibrium minimum wage where some are rationed out
(involuntary unemployment) because they are not capable of supplying the labour
at a lower wage (Ray, 1998, p.493). This is also consistent with the assumption that
households are drudgery averse (Chayanov, 1966; Nakajima, 1986). Based on
Nakajima (1986), we have assumed that the shadow wage (reservation wage) is an
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and leisure. Indiﬀerence curves between income and leisure will be upward sloping
and convex in labour and income space. Household preferences for leisure in in-
come-labour space are formulated as a reservation wage curve that is convex and up-
ward sloping and calibrated to ﬁt the observed seasonal labour supply/leisure
demand and wage rates in the area, and does not fall below a minimum level
wp ¼ b1 þ b2 þ b3ðDp  b4Þ2;
Dp ¼ Lp=W ;
Lp6 Lp;
Lp ¼ LpF  LpH þ LpO;
LpF ¼ LpC þ LpL;
LpT ¼ Lp þ LpE
ð7Þ
where b s are parameters,Dp is the seasonal family labour divided by the household la-
bour force (W), Lp is the maximum time which is available for work
3, LpC is seasonal
labour in crop production, LpL is seasonal labour in livestock production, LpO is sea-
sonal non-farm family labour 4, Lp is total seasonal family labour,LpF is total seasonal
on farm labour, andLpH is hired labour,LpT is the total seasonal time endowment, and
LpE is the seasonal leisure time. Labour for conservation (building of new structures,
maintenance of structures, and removal of old structures) is included in LpC. Seasonal
non-farm family labourmay be constrained or unconstrained (alternative simulations)
but when it is unconstrained, it can take place in any season of the year.
Land market: There is an informal rental market for land in the area. This market
is interlinked with the output market as the rent is paid in the form of a share of the
output (share tenancy).
Oxen rental market: There is an imperfect market for oxen renting in the model.
Imperfections are due to moral hazard problems and seasonal timing constraints.
Oxen can only be rented in exchange for labour.
Seed market: It is assumed that markets for seed function well but a price band is
included making the price of purchased seeds 5% higher than the selling price. House-
holds also have the option of storing seeds from their own harvest for the next season.
Output markets: Output markets are assumed to functionwell but a price band is in-
cluded such that the purchase price is assumed to be 5% higher than the selling price.
Full income and cash constraints
Expected full income is the sum of expected crop and livestock production values
less input costs, oﬀ farm income and the value of leisure3 Maximum time available for farm work is determined by subtracting religious holidays from the total
number of days in the period. Work on the farm on religious holidays is not allowed.
4 In this model no non-farm labour is allocated to land conservation (like FFW or CFW projects). The
constraint on access is imposed on the total amount of time spent in non-farm employment.
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where peC and p
e
L are vectors of expected prices
5 for crop and livestock production,
pqc and pqL are prices of inputs in crop and livestock production, QC and QL are vec-
tors of non-labour input quantities in crop and livestock production, wpO is a vector
of seasonal wage rates in oﬀ-farm employment, and LpO is a vector of seasonal par-
ticipation in the labour market.
The cash constraint for farm input purchase is derived from an extended quad-
ratic expenditure system. The quadratic term was insigniﬁcant and was therefore,
omitted in the case of input expenditure. This implies that an increase in income
through improved access to non-farm income also aﬀects the cash constraint.
Land degradation and conservation
The main forms of land degradation in the model are soil erosion and nutrient
depletion. For simplicity we only focus on soil erosion in this paper. Plot level soil
erosion per unit of land (seAq) is a function of soil type, soil depth and slope
(land type class, Aq), rainfall (wr), crop choice (Cr), and use of conservation
technology (W)
seAq ¼ seðAq;wr;Cr;WÞ: ð9Þ
Soil erosion rates were determined based on ﬁeld experiments carried out by the in
the study area (Shiferaw and Holden, 2001). Farmers may inﬂuence soil erosion rates
through their crop choice/land use or by building or removing conservation technol-
ogies on the diﬀerent types of land. The model implicitly evaluates the proﬁtability of
erosion control on the diﬀerent types of land (soil type, soil depth and land slope).
Soil erosion aﬀects soil depth (sd) through a transition equation
sdt ¼ sdt1  sset; ð10Þ
where s is a conversion factor.
Households may decide to conserve their land by introducing conservation struc-
tures (graded soil/stone bunds). Only labour is needed as an input for this, 100–120
working days per ha, depending on the slope of the land. Maintenance of the struc-
tures requires an additional 15–20 working days per year and ha. Shiferaw and Hol-
den (1998) found, based on econometric analysis of plot level data collected in 1994,
that poor and land-scarce households were more likely to dismantle conservation
structures introduced through food-for-work in the early 1980s. Therefore, in our
model households may also decide to remove conservation structures and this is esti-
mated to take only 25% of the time required for construction. The conservation
structures may occupy some productive land, therefore reducing the eﬀective
cropping area and this may reduce initial crop yields.5 The expected prices depend on the probability of drought (weighted prices).
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Yields of diﬀerent crops are functions of soil type, soil depth, slope, application of
fertiliser and manure converted into nitrogen (N) and phosphorus (P), and conser-
vation technology (W). The intercept of the yield (yiint) function, suppressing the
crop type and year, is a function of soil type (Aq) and soil depth (sd)
yiint ¼ yiðAq; sdÞ: ð11Þ
The impact of soil depth on crop yield intercepts was estimated econometrically
using farm level experimental data from the study area and testing alternative
functional forms 6. The ﬁnal yields, including inputs, were also estimated
econometrically 7
yiAq ¼ yiðyiint;W;wr;NF;/;PFÞ; ð12Þ
where wr is rainfall (drought or normal year), NF is fertiliser and manure nitrogen
added, / is the change in available mineralised nitrogen, and PF is phosphorus added
through fertilisers and manure. Yields may be inﬂuenced by conservation technolo-
gies (W) as conservation structures take up some part of the land, the structures may
harbor pests, they may reduce runoﬀ and leaching and, of course, erosion. The short
term eﬀect on yields of the use of conservation technologies is therefore ambiguous
but over time yields under conservation should decline less rapidly than without
conservation.
This gives a brief overview of the essential parts of the model that have most rel-
evance here.Overall model characteristics and calibration
The model is non-linear in constraints and objective function. It has been pro-
grammed in GAMS. The current simulations were run for 10 years. The model
had 79 000 variables and 46 000 equations. The model was calibrated to the biophys-
ical and socio-economic characteristics of the case study area. Results are presented
for the dominant household groups with two or more oxen. This group farms close
to 70% of the land in the study area.
For the case study area we have unique availability of both biophysical and socio-
economic data covering more than a 15 year period. Collection of biophysical data
was started by the soil conservation research project (SCRP) when a ﬁeld station was
established in 1982. These data included soil erosion data at plot and watershed lev-
els, yield measurements, conservation technology experiments, soil chemical and
physical analyses, and meteorological data. Household survey data were collected
in 1986, 1993/1994, 1997/1998 and 1999/2000. These surveys also included detailed6 See Shiferaw and Holden (2001) for details.
7 Using data from FAO fertiliser demonstration plots for the Debre Berhan area, assessing alternative
functional forms.
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S. Holden et al. / Food Policy 29 (2004) 369–392 381data collection at farm plot level. The data provided a unique opportunity to care-
fully analyse a number of policy-relevant issues.
We did not manage to make the bio-economic model solve for a 10 years per-
iod when access to both wage employment and credit are restricted at very low
levels. We have therefore used the scenario with access to credit only as the
baseline scenario. The income in case without credit and without wage employ-
ment would be lower than for the case of credit only (Fig. 1) and the decline
over time is likely to be more rapid than in the case of credit only 8. This illus-
trates the severity of the combined eﬀects of land degradation, increasing popu-
lation pressure, stagnant technology, and drought risk in the case study area.
Households are becoming increasingly dependent on better market access or
assistance from the outside.8 Holden and Shiferaw (2004) used ﬁve years versions of the model and found that unconstrained
access to credit for purchase of fertilizer could increase income per capita of households by 8–20%. Due to
population increase, land constraint and land degradation, income per capita would fall by 8% over a ﬁve
year period when there is access to credit and by 16% when there is no access to credit.
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and oﬀ-farm income and credit.
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Market access and household welfare
The impact of unconstrained access to low-wage non-farm wage employment (at
1999 wage rates), unconstrained access to credit, and combined unconstrained access
to wage employment and credit on household income per capita are presented in
Fig. 1. We see that unconstrained access to low-wage oﬀ-farm income yields a much
higher income than provision of credit alone. Provision of credit in addition to
unconstrained access to low-wage income had little additional eﬀect on household
income.
We see from Fig. 1 that unconstrained access to wage employment at the going
wage rates in Andit Tid would have substantially improved household income in
the area. The fact that households have low levels of non-farm income (Table 1) indi-
cates that access to low-wage employment is constrained. Otherwise, households in
the study area would have worked much more outside the farm given their small
farms and the risk of agricultural production. Provision of better employment
opportunities for unskilled labour (at low wages) may thus substantially improve
household income in the study area.
Fig. 2 shows that unconstrained access to oﬀ-farm wage employment substantially
improves household cash income and it also stabilizes income over time compared to
provision of credit only. We will return to the reason for this later. Fig. 3 illustrates
that unconstrained access to oﬀ-farm income reduces the demand for credit for pur-
chase of farm inputs over time. This shows how the income-earned oﬀ-farm is being
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Fig. 3. Credit utilization by households with unconstrained access to oﬀ-farm income only, credit only
and oﬀ-farm and credit.
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384 S. Holden et al. / Food Policy 29 (2004) 369–392spent to ﬁnance purchase of fertilizer. Oﬀ-farm income complements fertilizer credit
to purchase inputs. The straight line for oﬀ-farm employment access only shows the
credit constraint.
We see from Fig. 4 that constrained access to non-farm wage employment and
land constraints lead to a build-up of un-utilized household labour (‘‘leisure’’ = sur-
plus labour) due to limited intensiﬁcation and extensiﬁcation opportunities in farm-
ing. This is also because the work force grows over time due to population growth.
The reservation wage in the model prevents the opportunity cost of labour from fall-
ing to zero.
Agricultural production and input use
We will now look at how diﬀerent market access conditions aﬀect the agricultural
production over time. Fig. 5 shows that households with constrained access to
oﬀ-farm wage employment cultivate more of their land. This is because they have
a lower opportunity cost of labour. Unconstrained access to credit but not to
non-farm employment creates more incentives for land cultivation than having
access to both credit and non-farm employment. Agricultural production is contin-
ued on a larger area for a longer period of time when households have unconstrained
access to credit only.
The eﬀect on livestock capital of households under the diﬀerent market access
conditions is illustrated in Fig. 6. We see that households with access to credit only1
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Fig. 5. Total cultivated area by households with unconstrained access to oﬀ-farm income only, credit only
and oﬀ-farm and credit.
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ment (with or without credit constraint). There is a downward trend in livestock cap-
ital over the ten years period, however, probably as a result of a decline in fodder
production due to land degradation.
Fig. 7 shows that households with unconstrained access to credit only remain net
sellers of crops in years with good rains for most of the 10 year time period. The sur-
plus declines over time, however, and turns into a net deﬁcit in the last year. House-
holds with access to non-farm income become deﬁcit producers of food crops in
years with good rainfall already after four years and the deﬁcit grows to more than
1000 kg of grain per household by the 10th year. There are two reasons for this;
ﬁrst incentives for own food production are reduced due to the competition for
labour and higher opportunity cost of time; secondly because oﬀ-farm income in-
creases total income and consequently also demand for food since food is a normal
good.
Households with unconstrained access to both credit and non-farm wage employ-
ment become deﬁcit producers after 5 years already. They produce more food grain
in the initial years than households with unconstrained access to non-farm wage
employment only but they have a more rapid decline in food grain production
and have after 10 years a deﬁcit as large as those with unconstrained access to
non-farm income only. Better access to non-farm income therefore reduces incen-
tives to produce crops and produce a surplus or be self-suﬃcient in food grains.
The pattern is very similar in drought years (Fig. 8, if the year was a drought year)-2000
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Fig. 8. Net sale of crops by households with unconstrained access to oﬀ-farm income only, credit only and
oﬀ-farm and credit in years with drought.
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above 1000 kg of grains for households with unconstrained access to credit only over
the 10 years period, while it increases from 600 to above 1500 kg for households with
access to non-farm wage employment (with or without access to credit).
Farm labour input use is shown in Fig. 9. It can be seen that households with
unconstrained access to credit only put much more labour into farming than house-
holds with unconstrained access to non-farm income. Access to credit does not help
much for the incentives to work on the farm when there is unconstrained access to
non-farm wage employment. Fig. 10 illustrates that the demand for non-farm
employment (labour surplus) increases steadily due to the growth in the labour force
(growing surplus labour). Land degradation and poor land quality also contributes
(push factor) to the increasing demand for nonfarm activity.
Land degradation and conservation
We see from Fig. 11 that households with unconstrained access to credit only, had
more incentives to conserve their land and conserved much more of it than house-
holds with unconstrained access to non-farm wage employment only. Households
with unconstrained access to credit and non-farm wage employment conserved even
a smaller share of their land than households with unconstrained access to non-farm
wage employment only. In Fig. 12 we see the consequences of this for the total
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Fig. 10. Oﬀ-farm labour input of households with unconstrained access to oﬀ-farm income only, credit
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S. Holden et al. / Food Policy 29 (2004) 369–392 389erosion on the typical farm. Even though households with unconstrained access to
non-farm employment cultivate smaller land areas (have less intensive agricultural
production), their activities cause more erosion than that of households with uncon-
strained access to credit only because they conserve a much smaller proportion of
their farmland. This is because of the relatively lower returns to soil conservation
compared to the low wage in oﬀ-farm employment. It appears therefore, that provi-
sion of better non-farm employment opportunities does not give win–win beneﬁts as
the natural resource base will suﬀer more due to neglect. Returns to labour in less
sustainable agricultural practices are still high enough to be continued. Despite the
increased availability of cash income it is not allocated to hiring of labour for land
conservation (because of search, screening and monitoring costs related to hiring la-
bour), and other purchased inputs are not used for land conservation. It is only when
the shadow wage is very low due to lack of access to non-farm income that it pays to
invest labour in conservation. Conservation activities are carried out outside the
peak agricultural seasons when opportunity cost of time is low (when non-farm
opportunities are very limited).
Leaving land fallow does not cause erosion to stop but erosion rates are lower on
fallowed land than on cropped land and this is a one important reason for the reduc-
tion in erosion over time. Increasing use of conservation technologies is the other
reason for reduced erosion rates over time in the baseline scenario with credit only.60
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We have used a calibrated dynamic bio-economic farm household model to assess
the impact of improved access to oﬀ-farm income and farm credit on household wel-
fare, agricultural production (output and input use), land degradation and conserva-
tion incentives in a severely degraded area in the Ethiopian highlands.
We found that unconstrained access to low-wage non-farm income could substan-
tially improve the income of households in the case study area. It could improve in-
come substantially more than did provision of unconstrained access to credit for
purchase of farm inputs. Empirical data on non-farm incomes in the study area
clearly indicate that access to such income is constrained.
Better access to non-farm income reduces incentives to do farming activities and
this leads to lower agricultural production, including production of own food.
Households therefore become net buyers of food. This shows that even thought there
may be surplus labour in agriculture, the marginal return to labour is not zero and
removal of labour has a negative eﬀect on agricultural production because the mar-
ginal return to labour increases when it becomes more scarce.
The reduced pressure on the natural resource base due to improved access to non-
farm income is not good for the environment, however. Because improved access to
non-farm income undermines incentives to conserve land, the overall eﬀect is in-
creased land degradation in form of erosion. There appears therefore to be no
win-win beneﬁts from improving the access to non-farm income. Complementary
policies are required to protect the natural resource base. FFW projects targeting
land conservation may a useful approach that has demonstrated some success in
the Tigray Region of Ethiopia (Hagos and Holden, 2002, 2003).References
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